Sovereign Debt Restructuring: New Articles, New Contracts--Or No Change? by Marcus H. Miller
“The prospect of recurrent and uncontrolled fi-
nancial crises is one of the gravest threats to
an open and liberal international economic or-
der… Recent events in Turkey and Argentina
demonstrate that financial crises with poten-
tially profound consequences for economic and
political stability are not a thing of the past.
They also demonstrate the continued urgency
of finding practical and concrete means to
handle the crises that do occur.”
              Arminio Fraga and Daniel Gleizer (2001)
Introduction and Overview
It was at the National Economists’ Club
in November 2001 that Anne Krueger, first
deputy managing director of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, threw down the
gauntlet. “There is,” she said, “a gaping hole
[in the international financial architec-
ture]—we lack incentives to help countries
with unsustainable debts resolve them
promptly and in an orderly way. At present
the only available mechanism requires the
international community to bail out the
private creditors. It is high time this hole
was filled.”
Her own bold proposal—a Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) involv-
ing a key role for the IMF—has had a cata-
lytic effect on the debate. So too has the
evolving situation in Argentina, as it headed
inexorably toward drastic devaluation and
dramatic default in what was called a “slow
motion train crash.” Why should a country
whose net external indebtedness amounts
to less than a quarter of its annual output
be in such a mess?
To address these challenges, the Insti-
tute for International Economics organized
a conference in April 2002 involving
policymakers, economists, and lawyers. In
his opening survey of the field, Barry
Eichengreen (2002) divided the contenders
into three camps—those like Anne Krueger
pushing for radical reform; those like him-
self advocating limited reform; and those
who believe that markets are perfectly ca-
pable of resolving debt crises so no reform
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      Change?
A pessimist might claim it is
“déjà vu all over again.” An optimist
could visualize things developing
along the lines the US Treasury
advocates. Despite the apparent
dissonance, the approaches taken
by the IMF and the US Treasury
could be complementary
rather than contradictory.
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is necessary. True to form, Anne Krueger took the
lead in advancing the case for institutional innova-
tion and called for a change in the Articles of Agree-
ment of the IMF. But the updated restructuring
scheme she presented qualified the earlier version
in reducing the planned role for the IMF and greatly
increasing the part to be played by commercial credi-
tors: for they, not the IMF, would decide whether or
not a stay on payments would be extended. Where, in
this spectrum of revolution, evolution, or stasis, would
the United States take its stand? Given the blocking
vote that the United States possesses on any changes
of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, this is a key
issue. The answer was not long in coming, delivered
the next day by John Taylor, an erstwhile colleague
of Anne Krueger at Stanford, now speaking for the
US Treasury.
Addressing the serried ranks of assembled spe-
cialists—and the world’s financial press—John Tay-
lor began by agreeing that the option of doing noth-
ing should be dismissed: reform of the process of sov-
ereign debt restructuring in emerging markets is
long overdue, he said. But then, in contrast to Anne
Krueger, he advocated a decentralized, market-ori-
ented approach in which sovereign debtors and their
creditors put new clauses into their debt contracts to
cover the contingency of debt restructuring. Effec-
tively he professed his allegiance to the camp of lim-
ited reform. Since this approach, of inserting collec-
tive action clauses, had not been adopted in global
financial markets despite earlier endorsement by the
G-10 in the Rey Report of 1996, he also recommended
that incentives be given in the form of sticks and
carrots.
Where does this take things? A pessimist might
claim it is “déjà vu all over again”: nothing has really
changed, and Anne Krueger’s scheme was but inter-
esting research—as John Taylor described it. An op-
timist could visualize things developing along the
lines of the “workable, decentralized, market-oriented
approach to reform” that the US Treasury advocates.
A cynic might see the hand of Wall Street on the
tiller.
This policy brief begins with an outline of the op-
tions on offer, principally the “statutory” approach of
the IMF Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism,
and the “contracts” approach supported by the US
Treasury. It includes a brief look at the history of
corporate debt restructuring in the United Kingdom
and the United States, to see what light this might
shed on the current lively debate. There follows a
strategic analysis of why reform is needed to limit
the risk of investors’ moral hazard in the interna-
tional financial system and the value of  “keeping
your options open.” After a brief discussion of next
steps, we conclude that, despite the apparent disso-
nance, the approaches taken by the IMF and the US
Treasury could be complementary rather than con-
tradictory. The way forward is to proceed with con-
tractual changes, while keeping the option of statu-
tory intervention very much alive. The threat of
statutory change would give lawyers the incentive
they need to write ingenious contracts for creditor
coordination!
Options on Offer
The problem to be faced, and the objectives of dis-
cussion, can be briefly stated as:
“Far-reaching developments in capital mar-
kets over the last two or three decades have
not been matched by the development of an or-
derly, predictable framework for creditor coordi-
nation, in which the roles of the debtor, the credi-
tors and the international community are clearly
spelt out. … [This] imposes significant costs on
all the parties involved….Our goal therefore
should be the creation of better incentives to en-
courage the orderly and timely restructuring of
unsustainable sovereign debts, while protecting
asset values and creditors’ rights.”
                                    Anne Krueger (2002, 7, 8)
Historical Background
To manage the process of sovereign debt restruc-
turing, the IMF has proposed legal procedures rather
like those of Chapter 11 of the US Corporate Bank-
ruptcy Code (Anne Krueger, 2001 and 2002). In seek-
ing to improve on the work of the original architects
at Bretton Woods, several others have pursued this
analogy, as a recent paper by Rogoff and Zettelmeyer
(2002) indicates. Further historical background was
provided at the conference.
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The global economy now faces much
the same problem as London bond
markets did in the 19th century.
The historical experience with
corporate debt suggests two ways
forward: the London-style solution of
self-organizing creditors on the
one hand, and the New York
court-ordered approach on the other.       April 2002 PB02-3 3
Buchheit and Gulati (2002) point out that for most
of the 19th century, London bonds could not be restruc-
tured. But the problems this posed—forcing into liq-
uidation many firms facing temporary liquidity prob-
lems—led to the insertion of the majority action
clauses that now characterize London debt. (These
clauses allowed a 75 percent majority in a meeting
with a quorum to amend bonds in any respect.) In
the United States, however, these flexible restruc-
turing terms fell afoul of the statutory requirements
for “negotiable instruments;” so they could not be
listed. Collective action clauses were “the road not
taken” and US markets operated with New York debt
requiring unanimity for changing any of the payment
terms. To cope with liquidity crises, procedures for
court-ordered restructuring were developed instead,
Chapter 11 being put in the statute book in the 1930s.
As most emerging-market debt is denominated
in dollars, it is hardly surprising that New York terms
have become widespread for sovereign debtors. This
makes sovereign debt extremely difficult to restruc-
ture. As Lee Buchheit suggested (drawing from
Buchheit and Gulati 2002), the global economy now
faces much the same problem as London bond mar-
kets did in the 19th century. The historical experi-
ence with corporate debt suggests two ways forward:
the London-style solution of self-organizing creditors
on the one hand, and the New York court-ordered
approach on the other.
In supporting the widespread adoption of collec-
tive action clauses, Eichengreen and Portes (1995),
the Rey Report (1996), and now John Taylor (2002)
are taking the former route. But by advocating an
international bankruptcy court and/or workout pro-
cedures loosely modelled on Chapter 11 of the US
Bankruptcy Code, Jeffrey Sachs (1995), Steven
Schwarcz (2000), and now Anne Krueger (2001 and
2002) are effectively taking the other route.
Statutory Proposals
After this backward glance at history, it is time
to turn to the learned language of law. As a guide to
what follows, we begin with the main elements of
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and then indicate the mar-
ket failures these are designed to address.
•     The first priority under bankruptcy law is to stop
a creditor grab race for the debtor’s assets—this
can only be done by an automatic legal stay on the
enforcement of all lawsuits and claims against
the debtor when the latter “files for protection.”
•     To keep the business as a going concern—and to
finance its reorganization—preferred creditor sta-
tus is given for those providing new money—so-
called debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing.
•     To solve the collective action problems that occur
during negotiations—the problem of “holdouts”—
the basic mechanism is to override the contrac-
tual provisions of existing bond covenants (which
may call for unanimity) by supermajority voting.
The voting rules for each and every class of debt
require a majority of at least two-thirds in the
amount of outstanding claims and one half of the
holders of debt to enforce the restructuring agree-
ment.
•     Since supermajority voting provisions require all
classes of creditors to agree, cramdown provisions
(which allow confirmation of a plan even if not all
classes vote in favor1) are also needed.
Experience of corporate reorganization has demon-
strated that all four elements are needed to give both
the opportunity and the incentives to achieve effi-
cient restructuring of outstanding debt obligations.
These elements are summarized in the top row of
table 1.
The market failures giving rise to these legal pro-
visions were unforgettably portrayed by Nouriel
Roubini2 whose caricatures are surely worthy of
graphic illustration, perhaps in the style of James
Gillray, the famous 19th century illustrator. First
there is the rush for the exit, by those who cease roll-
ing over debt and accelerate payments wherever pos-
1. It is essentially a means of enforcing a plan even when
junior creditors hold out  (i.e. fail to provide a supermajority
vote).
2. Who is, in fact, sceptical of the extent to which these
market failures may justify a statutory approach to sovereign
debt restructuring. See Roubini (2002).
A key feature of the updated version
of the sovereign debt restructuring
mechanism is that the role and power
of creditors are considerably enhanced.
Besides approving the final
restructuring agreement,
it is they who would decide both the
duration of the automatic
stay and the granting of preferred
creditor status to new private
money provided after the stay.sible—this calls for a payments standstill. The need
for an “automatic stay” is to check the rush to the
courthouse by creditors trying to be first to establish
their legal claims. Then, in the courtroom itself, there
is the problem of freeriding by “rogue creditors” who
lie low as write-downs are negotiated, only to reap-
pear later in the proceedings with threats to block
the restructuring unless they are offered much bet-
ter terms themselves.3 Supermajority voting is de-
signed to bind these “holdouts” to accept the agreed
settlement. In addition, if bankruptcy provisions are
too lenient, there is the rush to default by debtors who
may have the capacity but lack the incentives to abide
by the terms of their debt contracts.4
Armed with these legal definitions and images,
we come to the IMF’s proposal for global financial re-
form. The new Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism
outlined by Anne Krueger in November 2001 (SDRM-
1 in table 1) was clearly inspired by the analogy of
Chapter 11 and provided for the cessation of claims
against the country in crisis, together with interim
financing from the IMF and a Fund-supervised vot-
ing process to determine the restructuring. The plan
included the four elements discussed above: (i) stand-
stills plus automatic stays to prevent a grab race; (ii)
preferred-creditor incentives for the provision of new
money by the private sector; (iii) conditionality on
the part of the debtor to negotiate in good faith and
adopt appropriate policies; and (iv) supermajority vot-
ing to bind minority creditors to a restructuring agree-
ment. The standstill would be activated if a request
by the debtor country was endorsed by the Fund and
would be subject to renewal by the IMF up to a maxi-
mum period beyond which it could not be maintained
without the approval of a required majority of credi-
tors. Though the adjudication of disputes and the
verification of claims were explicitly mentioned as
areas outside its competence, “the Fund’s role would
be essential to the success of such a system.”
(Krueger 2001).
A key feature of the updated version presented
at the Institute conference (SDRM-2) is that the role
and power of creditors are considerably enhanced.
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Table 1  Key features of debt workouts
Scheme/ Stopping a Financing Restraining
Features grab race reorganization holdouts
Chapter 11 Payments standstill Preferred status Negotiations Supermajority
bankruptcy plus automatic for new money          under court            voting plus
legal stay (DIP finance)            supervision             cramdown
Krueger (2001) Capital controls Preferred creditors Negotiations Supermajority
SDRM-1 plus automatic plus limited IMF supervised by voting plus
stay lending IMF plus arbitration?
IMF program
Krueger (2002) Payments standstill Preferred creditor Negotiations Supermajority
SDRM-2 plus  short stay, status for new supervised by voting* across
which may be money* neutral agency all classes
renewed* plus IMF program
Taylor (2002) Initiation clause Rules for meeting Supermajority
collective action to allow for governed by a voting clauses
clauses payments to be representation plus arbitration
suspended clause
Status quo Unilateral IMF “lending Bond swaps Exit consent
standstills into arrears” plus Paris Club
for bilateral debt
* to be decided by a supermajority vote of creditors.
3. The recent case of Elliott Associates, which extracted full
payment from Peru by threatening to interrupt payments on
the restructured debt, was discussed in Krueger  (2001 and
2002).
4. In the papers presented at the conference, isses of “debtor
moral hazard” were emphasized by Michael Chamberlain (2002):
while the interaction of debtor incentives with creditor
coordination problems was analyzed by Ghosal and Miller
(2002).
Restructuring
debtBesides approving the final restructuring agreement,
it is they who would decide both the duration of the
automatic stay and the granting of preferred creditor
status to new private money provided after the stay,
as indicated in table 1, where the asterisks show
points of creditor control. The mechanism for exer-
cising this control would be supermajority voting, but
the required majority was not explicitly stated. (In
response to questions, however, a figure “somewhere
between two-thirds and 80-85 percent” was indicated.)
While collective action clauses also embody simi-
lar provisions for supermajority voting, the IMF found
two major objections to exclusive reliance on collec-
tive action clauses, namely the problems of aggrega-
tion and of transition (Anne Krueger, 2002, 14). The
former refers to the need to coordinate creditors across
different classes—what the legal device of a
cramdown is designed to achieve. The latter refers
to the fact that if collective action clauses are only
included in new issues, it will take many years be-
fore the stock of outstanding debt can be substan-
tially restructured.
The idea that court-ordered supervision is not
essential for debt restructuring was seconded by
Steven Schwarcz. In his presentation at the confer-
ence, he discussed his proposal for an international
legal convention, with provisions for preferred creditor
status and supermajority voting, but not for an auto-
matic stay nor for a cramdown. Though it is a refor-
mulation of Chapter 11 explicitly for sovereigns, the
author emphasized that “contrary to assumptions
made in the economic literature, the Convention
would be largely self-executing and would not require
supervision by a bankruptcy court,” Schwarcz (2000,
183).
In this context, it is important to note that debt
restructuring need not necessarily involve a reduction in
net present value. A corporation filing for Chapter 11
protection does not have to be insolvent—it just has
to be unable to service its current liabilities, includ-
ing capital repayments due (i.e., the problem may be
one of illiquidity). By implication, there is no reason
why the triggering of sovereign debt restructuring
need necessarily involve a decisive judgement as to
the nature of the crisis. But the SDRM proposals com-
ing from the IMF are explicitly restricted to cases of
“unsustainable” sovereign debts (i.e., solvency cri-
ses—for handling liquidity crises, mention is made
of collective action clauses.5) But because it is usu-
ally so difficult to distinguish between illiquidity and
unsustainability under crisis conditions, this must
count as a design weakness in the proposed mecha-
nism.
Contractual Proposals
In advocating the path of limited reform, Barry
Eichengreen, a long-term advocate of collective ac-
tion clauses,6 listed their benefits as follows:
   i.      they entrust the restructuring process to
           the market
   ii.     through majority voting, they limit collective
      action problems
   iii.   they provide thresholds for litigation and de
facto sharing clauses
   iv.    they entail a de facto standstill provision
He acknowledged that there were drawbacks, in-
volving problems of asset diversity and market take-
up:
    i.       they do not ensure coordination across differ-
ent creditor groups
    ii.     they would have to be made universal to pre-
vent asset substitution
    iii.     they do not address problem of domestic cur-
rency debts
    iv.     they have not been widely adopted—the tran-
sition problem.
When John Taylor rose to speak in favor of the de-
centralized, market-based approach offered by these
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When John Taylor rose to speak
in favor of the decentralized, market-
based approach offered by these con-
tracts, it was made clear that the
US Treasury had given some thought
to the problems of transition.
To answer the objection that the cur-
rent position is not much
different from the line taken in
the Rey Report of the G-10—to little
effect—the US Treasury proposed
adding substantial “carrots
and sticks” as incentives to change.
5. “Collective action clauses can make a useful contribution to
the resolution of debt problems, especially in cases of illiquidity
where a smoothing-out of the debt service profile is required
rather than a reduction in the net present value of the
sovereign’s overall obligations.” Krueger (2002, 16).
6. See, for example, Eichengreen and Portes (1995).contracts, he argued first that there should be major-
ity action clauses (where bondholders holding, say, 75
percent of the principal could agree to a restructur-
ing which would be binding on the minority). He also
advocated the inclusion of representation clauses (de-
scribing the process through which creditors would
come together during a restructuring) and initiation
clauses (describing how a standstill would be put in
place with an automatic stay, until restructuring dis-
cussions got under way). (See table 1, row 4.)
It was made clear that the US Treasury had given
some thought to problems of transition. To answer
the objection that the current position is not much
different from the line taken in the Rey Report of the
G-10—to little effect—the US Treasury proposed add-
ing substantial  “carrots and sticks” as incentives to
change. Carrots  could  include   lower  interest rate
charges (for countries with such clauses) when bor-
rowing from the IMF; and further financial induce-
ments to carry out bond swaps on the existing stock.
As a stick, the insertion of such clauses could be made
a precondition of seeking an IMF program. This may
sound a powerful threat, but is it credible that the
IMF could withhold assistance in a crisis on such a
technicality?
7
To tackle problems of asset diversity, it was pro-
posed that such clauses could be included in bank
debt as well. As for problems of aggregation across
creditor classes, it was proposed that disputes between
creditors could be handled in an arbitration process
provided for in the contracts themselves. The paper
presented by Bartholomew, Stern, and Luizzi (2002)
offered an ingenious two-step bond swap where the
first step is a bond swap designed to achieve unifor-
mity of claim, and the second step is the actual re-
construction. Has the private sector already found
an elegant and workable solution to the thorny prob-
lem of aggregation? And, if so, will Argentina provide
the acid test?
Subsequent to the meeting, the Institute for In-
ternational Finance (IIF)—previously seen as the
defenders of the status quo—has given explicit en-
dorsement to the insertion of collective action
clauses, as we report below. Their proposal for estab-
lishing a Private Sector Advisory Group might also
be designed to address some of the aggregation is-
sues left unresolved in the US Treasury’s document.
Status Quo
What of the status quo, with unilateral standstills
(backed perhaps by IMF lending into arrears) and bond
swaps, as indicated in the last line of table 1? If there
was any selection bias working against the “no re-
form” camp at the Institute for International Econom-
ics conference, there is no denying that in Nouriel
Roubini, that camp found an eloquent spokesman.
He counts himself among those who support the sta-
tus quo, though his allegiance is explicitly based on
a second-best argument, for he writes, “while ideally
a “statutory approach” or a “contractual approach”
would solve these collective action problems and thus
be welcome institutional developments, they are both
unlikely to emerge, for a complex set of political-
economy issues,” Roubini (2002). What he refers to
as the status quo includes the mechanism of take-
it-or-leave-it bond swaps used in Pakistan, Ukraine,
Ecuador, and Russia, and also the exit consents8 used
in Ecuador. It even includes “creative variants of the
status quo…[with] market-based orderly restructurings
that reduce risks of litigation and/or free riding,” see,
for example the recent JPMorgan proposal by
Bartholomew, Stern, and Luizzi (2002). So when
Roubini speaks of the status quo it is hardly a situa-
tion of stasis: it is full of the creative legal inven-
tions that the reformers are claiming will help their
cause to succeed!
A more robust criticism of radical reform was
offered by Jeremy Bulow (2002). In his paper to the
Brookings Panel, he said bluntly, “An international
bankruptcy court does not seem like a good idea. Put
aside the issue of existing debt and assume it all
April 2002 6 PB02-3
8. The “exit consent” mechanism for debt restructuring analyzed
by Buchheit and Gulati (2000), involves no change to the
existing legal rights of creditors or debtors: the idea is that
creditors willing to restructure can outmaneuver holdouts by
using the supermajority voting features of existing bonds to
secure changes, which reduce their value as they are tendered
in exchange for restructured debt.
The alternative adopted by the
radical reformers is to change the
rules of the game to allow for
systematic creditor bail-ins. If the
bail-in is orderly, then it is credible
for the IMF not to get financially involved.
This is the logic behind the approach
adopted by Anne Krueger
 where the IMF authorizes
some form of payments
suspension to be followed
by an international debt workout.
7. If not, might countries not have an added incentive to exclude
such clauses as a (cheap) signal of commitment not to default?            April 2002 PB02-3 7
miraculously disappeared. Even so the myriad prob-
lems in determining who would judge such a court ,
what claims would be covered, and how the court’s
decisions would be enforced, make it seem a less
desirable alternative than the current system.”
Nor Nor did the paper express any enthusiasm for
the US Treasury’s plan of pressing for the adoption of
UK-style restructuring conventions. On the contrary,
Bulow questioned “the extent to which we should al-
low outside enforcement technology, say the laws of
the United States and Great Britain, to enable third
world governments to borrow more than they could
manage otherwise.” His specific proposal—to “elimi-
nate the sovereign immunity waivers that allow debt-
ors and creditors to use first world courts to enforce
third world agreements”—was much criticized by
Nouriel Roubini, his discussant at the Brookings
Panel, who characterized it as a device to “shut down
or severely restrict the ability of  “reckless” sover-
eign debtors to borrow internationally,” Roubini (2002,
11-13).
  than ations:
Strategic Considerations: Keeping Your
Options Open
Before looking at possible next steps in debt re-
structuring arrangements, it is worth standing back
from the legal detail, in order to see some of strategic
influences driving the debate.9 This section suggests
the value of keeping “statutory” change as a valid
option, even while trying the path of  “contractual”
reform.
In the absence of reform (radical or otherwise),
the IMF faces an unpalatable policy choice in deal-
ing with a capital account crisis involving sovereign
debt—to organize a wholesale “bailout” of the credi-
tors, or to leave the emerging-market sovereign
debtor to the uncertain fate of disorderly default. Look-
ing at incentives as a strategic game between credi-
tors and the IMF suggests that, in these circum-
stances, the latter may be “gamed” into providing
“bailouts”. This point has been made by both Stanley
Fischer (2001), the outgoing first deputy managing
director of the IMF, in his Lionel Robbins Lecture at
the London School of Economics in October 2001, and
by his successor Anne Krueger (2001), in the Novem-
ber speech quoted above.
At first blush, the answer seems clear—the IMF
should simply  “say no” to bailouts—or  “limit access”
to financial support in this form, as was proposed by
the Meltzer Commission, (IFIAC 2000), which rec-
ommended prequalification criteria for access. But
this neglects the order of play, which gives creditors
a first mover advantage as shown in box 1.
The argument is that, because they know that
the IMF will step in to help the debtor pay them off,
creditors have an incentive to make rash loans and
then, when things go bad, to rush for the exit or to
grab assets. In other words, the system is character-
ized by “investor’s moral hazard.”
If just saying no is not credible, how about say-
ing no sometimes? That is, following a policy of con-
structive ambiguity, which makes bailouts less of a
sure thing. The idea is that the risk of not being res-
cued gives the creditor the incentive to roll over
debt—even if it involves some write-down—as this 9. Kumar and Miller (2000) contains further discussion.
Box 1 The “time consistency trap”
The argument that reform of the architecture
is necessary to save the IMF from what has been
dubbed the “time consistency trap” (Miller and
Zhang 2000) can be illustrated by a game tree that
shows the order of play, as in figure 1.
In reality there are several players involved—
including creditors, the sovereign borrower, and the
IMF. To keep things simple, we treat them as two:
the creditors and the debtor-plus-IMF. In the same
spirit, we assume that nature determines whether
or not there is a crisis. In the good state each of
the two parties gets the highest payoff, a , but pay-
offs in the bad state when a financial crisis occurs
depend on how the crisis is handled.
 If the creditor rolls over the loan, for example,
both parties get a  payoff of  b. If not, the solid lines
indicate two very different prospects: a bailout en-
sures that the creditor still getsáa, but the debtor
only receives g; but with no action both receive de-
fault payouts of d. What will transpire is seen by
working backward. At the second stage, the IMF
chooses a bailout in order to avoid a default scenario.
This is shown by the arrowhead on the left-hand
branch of the two choices facing the IMF. Knowing
this, the creditor fails to rollover, as shown by the
arrowhead on the left-hand branch of the two choices
facing the creditor. So there is no creditor involve-
ment, just bailouts. (Two ways of escaping this trap
indicated in the figure—constructive ambiguity and bail-
ins—are discussed below.) 8 April 2002
may be preferable to a disorderly default. So the pri-
vate sector gets bailed in. In principle, this could do
the job.10 But there are practical pitfalls to this ap-
proach: first, there is the problem of stopping free rid-
ers who are unwilling to go along with any proposed
write-downs; second, there is the objection that ran-
domizing IMF rescues would fall afoul of the equal-
treatment principle for IMF members; and third, there
is the prediction that the denials of support will not
be random. Market expectations will lead to a bifur-
cation of spreads reflecting the probability of default—
with bailouts expected for countries of systemic im-
portance (“too big to fail”), and defaults for the rest.
The alternative adopted by the radical reformers
is to change the rules of the game to allow for sys-
tematic creditor bail-ins. If the bail-in is orderly, then
it is credible for the IMF not to get financially involved,
i.e., it should shield the IMF from being gamed into
generous bailouts. This is, we believe, the logic be-
hind the approach adopted by Anne Krueger (2001
and 2002) where the IMF authorizes some form of
payments suspension to be followed by an interna-
tional debt workout.11
The logic of those advocating limited reform is
not so different. The need for bailouts will be reduced
because of the availability of credible private sector
provisions. As John Taylor put it: “Sovereign debt re-
structuring reform will go a long way to help limit
official sector support.” But what if—because of un-
solved problems of aggregation and transition—rec-
ommending collective action clauses fails to work?
Then the IMF will be exposed to gaming once more
as it has been since 1996 when collective action
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Creditor payoff shown first
Figure 1  The time consistency trap and two proposals
10.  To continue with the example shown in box 1, if the IMF
uses a mixed strategy, choosing no action with probability p
and bailout with probability then this policy gives the creditor
the incentive to roll over so long as the expected payoff is less
than b (i.e. (1-p)a +p d < b).
11. How this might change the game is shown in the figure,
where the IMF now has another option labelled bail-in, with
pay-offs shown as b
-, b
-, i.e. something less than under the
rollover. Since the payoff for IMF-plus-debtor is greater than
the default payoff, the creditor can no longer count on being
bailed out. Faced instead with the prospect of a bail-in, the
creditor has the incentive to choose a rollover.         April 2002 PB02-3  9
Going back one step further, one has to ask what
incentives creditors have to write the appropriate con-
tracts, if the IMF only has bailouts on offer. John Tay-
lor talked of sticks and carrots: the financial carrots
may be helpful—but the real stick, we believe, is the
threat of an IMF scheme for debt restructuring! A
demonstrable benefit of the IMF devising statutory
bail-ins lies in giving incentives to lawyers working
for the private-sector creditors to produce their own
solutions. Should the latter succeed in solving the
problems of aggregation and of transition by ingenious
combinations of one- and two-step bond swaps, with
or without exit consents, they will earn their fees for
engineering orderly workouts. Should they fail, it will
be the turn of the lawyers working in the official sec-
tor to try their hand, armed with extra, statutory pow-
ers.
 Next Steps
Although the IMF voiced two major reservations
about relying exclusively on collective action clauses
(the problems of aggregation and of transition), they
have nevertheless expressed a willingness to sup-
port a strategy of seeing what these clauses can do.
This is partly a question of timing: as Anne Krueger
said in a press briefing, “let’s see what they can do
because, of course, they could be put in faster.”12 But
it may also be a matter of strategy: as just mentioned,
the market may be more willing to innovate under
the threat of statutory intervention by the IMF.
What steps can now be taken? What incentives
can be given to promote collective action clauses
and travel the path of limited reform? We indicate
half a dozen.
     i. Following the lead of Canada and the United
Kingdom, G-7 governments could insert col-
lective action clauses into their own foreign
currency debt. This should reduce the nega-
tive “signalling” currently associated with in-
cluding such clauses in emerging-market
bonds—and help overcome the hesitation of
those acting only “après vous, Alphonse!”
   ii.      Providing financial incentives for emerging-
market governments to include the relevant
clauses in new debt—these could be in the
form of interest rate reductions for borrowing
from the IMF for those who do so and/or fi-
nancial penalties for those who do not.
  iii.     Providing financial incentives to creditors to
swap their existing debt instruments for
those with the new clauses (using exit con-
sents, if necessary); cf. the 5 percent cash
incentive in the JPMorgan proposal (see
Bartholomew, Stern, and Luizzi 2000).
    iv.     Promoting competition between London and
New York in the provision of legal services
necessary to achieve these changes—there
are surely substantial fees to be earned.
     v.     Providing a venue for discussing the terms
of sovereign debt restructuring, an issue
that was raised by Michelle White (2002) in
her paper to the conference.
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     Subsequent to the conference, Charles
Dallara of the IIF has, in a letter to Gordon
Brown, chair of the International Monetary
and Financial Committee, proposed that
the IMF and the governments that form its
membership set up a “Private Sector
Advisory Group” that would offer its views
on debt restructuring in specific countries
to “sustain investor confidence and lay the
basis for orderly restructurings.” Such a
Bond Restructuring Forum might function
like the Paris Club for bilateral debt or the
London Club for bank debt. In table 2 we list
possible venues in G-7 financial centers
(and Switzerland)—including Washington,
DC, itself. The idea would be to amass the
expertise, legal and financial, necessary to
handle cases as expeditiously as possible,
so that, unlike Argentina, negotiators do
not have to start from scratch. Perhaps the
IMF could promote competition between
these financial centers to host such a
forum.
   vi.      Last, but by no means least, is further devel-
opment of the statutory alternative along the
lines of SDRM-2, both to provide an incen-
tive for legal ingenuity in creating contracts,
and to ensure a backstop if the latter should
prove unable to solve the problems of aggre-
12. Transcript of a teleconference on Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism, April 1, 2002.
13. Miller and Zhang (2000, 357) discuss the idea of a
Basle Club and give references to other like proposals.
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Conclusion: A Two-Pronged Approach to Reform
After the resolution of the Latin American debt
crisis of the 1980s, emerging markets enjoyed greatly
increased access to global capital markets. For a while
capital flowed freely and it seemed like the dawn of a
brave new world, with emerging markets growing fast
with the aid of substantial private development fi-
nance from the richer creditor nations. But it was
not to last: there came a succession of “sudden
stops,”14 starting with the “tequila crisis” of 1994-95,
with shattering consequences that have haunted
Table 2 Possible locations for a Bond Restructuring Forum
Country City Pro Con Comment
France Paris Neutral; home Bad signalling Has Secretariat
of Paris Club effect? and good reputation
for promptness
United
Kingdom London Home of Has collective
London Club; action clauses in
expertise on foreign currency
London debt sovereign debt
United New York Principal Not “neutral”; New York bond
States or jurisdiction not cheap. terms are part of
Washing- for emerging- the problem!
ton, DC market bonds; Washington, DC,
expertise on is home of the IMF
NY debt and US Treasury
Germany Frankfurt Neutral; Legal system
large holders of uses bond
emerging-market provisions like
bonds New York debt
Japan Tokyo Neutral; large Neither govern-
holders of ment nor legal
emerging-market system renown-
bonds ed for debt
restructuring
Italy Rome Neutral All roads
lead there!
Canada Toronto Neutral; uses Has collective
London debt; action clauses in
supports debt foreign currency
                   restructuring                               sovereign debt
Switzer- Basle Neutral; home
land  of BIS, FSF
14. Guillermo Calvo’s graphic phrase; see Calvo 2002.
emerging markets ever since. Few would dissent
from John Taylor’s view that “there have been too
many crises, which have discouraged capital flows
and damaged the affected economies.”
 The approach endorsed by the US Treasury to
improve the functioning of global bond markets is to
promote creditor self-organization by the insertion
of collective action clauses into bond contracts in
particular; and corporate bond markets offer histori-
cal evidence to support this approach. Such clauses
had their origin in 19th century London capital mar-
kets suffering from frequent failures of creditor co-
ordination and an excess of company liquidations.
They were widely adopted so that all debt issued on          April 2002 11     PB02-3
London terms allows for restructuring. Recent expe-
rience in global markets has been very different. Soon
after the Mexican crisis of 1994-95, the Rey Report
commissioned by the G-10 recommended the adop-
tion of such clauses, backed, if need be, by a policy of
IMF “lending into arrears”. But the dominant posi-
tion of New York terms has remained unshaken. So,
sovereign debt restructuring remains extremely dif-
ficult and uncertain.
The IMF has, in the circumstances, advocated
a statutory approach. After a change in the Fund’s
Articles, this would allow a supermajority of credi-
tors—acting under supervision of the IMF or some
other arbitrator—to make a restructuring binding on
holdouts. It is something of an irony that US corpo-
rate history provides a precedent for this approach.
When firms were collapsing like ninepins in the
Great Depression, Chapter 11 was added to the US
Bankruptcy Code to release the stranglehold that una-
nimity imposed on the process of corporate debt re-
structuring. While accepting that reform is “long over-
due”, however, John Taylor has declined to endorse
the IMF initiative. Wittingly or not, his intervention
has demonstrated the blocking power of the holdout
creditor. It takes a supermajority vote of 85 percent
of IMF’s shareholders to change the Articles; and the
United States alone has more than 17 percent of the
votes.
As the United States accepts that reform of the
process of sovereign debt restructuring in emerging
markets “is long overdue”, it will doubtless do its best
to ensure its preferred approach works—with finan-
cial and other incentives as discussed above. Should
this approach fail to deliver, then—on the principle
that he who wills the end wills the means—the
United States will need to withdraw its blocking vote
and support the IMF position. If not, it will be putting
the latter in the unenviable position of being charged
with managing crises but denied the tools needed
for the purpose. Assuming that the clock is not to be
turned back to the days of bigger and bigger bailouts,
the IMF would, in all fairness, have to warn emerg-
ing-market debtors of the substantial risks and un-
certainties to be faced should they ever be unable to
service their debt—citing Argentina as a case in
point.15 They might be forced to recommend (or im-
pose16) capital controls to limit risk exposure in glo-
bal markets without restructuring provisions.
Such a stand-off between the IMF and its largest
shareholder would be unfortunate, to say the least.
It is also unnecessary, as strategic considerations
suggest the two approaches are, in fact, complemen-
tary. Two developments support this conclusion: first,
London has, despite the existence of collective ac-
tion clauses, recently being trying to bring its corpo-
rate bankruptcy law more into line with US practice
as enshrined in Chapter 11; and second, for reasons
of aggregation, bond exchanges were used in Paki-
stan, despite the existence of collective action
clauses.
More to the point, the IMF and the US Treasury
have themselves noted this complementarity. In her
Institute keynote address, for instance, Anne
Krueger recommended collective action clauses for
handling liquidity crisis—and in the press briefing
she confirmed that the IMF was willing to see what
collective action clauses can do, in part because they
can be “put in faster” than statutory changes.
17
  Sub-
sequently Randal Quarles, assistant secretary for the
US Treasury for international affairs, is reported as
saying, “the two approaches are complementary;
[they] aren’t exclusive of one another. The Treasury
approach is easier to start up quickly, while there’s
obviously more ramp-up time on the [IMF’s] ap-
proach.”
18
The IMF has concluded that the process of sover-
eign debt restructuring in emerging markets badly
needs reform and it has put forward a carefully re-
vised plan of statutory change to ensure active credi-
tor involvement in orderly workouts. The US endorse-
ment of an explicitly contractual approach was widely
interpreted as a rebuff.
19 
But these two strategies can,
we believe, be pursued in tandem. The private sec-
tor can, as Taylor proposes, be given every encour-
agement—with sticks and financial carrots—to in-
corporate collective action clauses into new sover-
eign debt contracts (including those swapped for cur-
rently existing debt so as to solve the transition prob-
lem). Meantime, the lawyers in the IMF can refine
the scheme advanced by Anne Krueger so as to in-
corporate whatever the private sector devises, and
to provide the “statutory” support necessary to tackle
outstanding issues of intercreditor equity (the ag-
gregation problem). The knowledge that this parallel
effort is in motion should give added incentives for
private sector ingenuity at the contractual stage. Or-
derly restructuring procedures are more likely to be
developed using this two-pronged strategy of reform
than from either approach in isolation.
15. Where it is rumoured that the restructured debt will have
to contain collective action clauses.
16. Karin Lissakers, ex-US executive director at the IMF, argued
at the Institute conference that the IMF had the authority under
Article 6 to ask a country to impose capital controls; and that
it should do so in times of financial crisis “to trigger the
restructuring and stop the bleeding of money in the mean-
time.”
18. Washington Post, April 9, 2002, E4.
19. See, for example, the report in the Economist (Economics
Focus, April 6, 2002, 67), “Sovereign bankruptcies: Two
Bush appointees are at loggerheads about how to reform the
international financial system.”
17. Transcript of a Teleconference on Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism, April 1, 2002.April 2002 12        PB02-3
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